competence bloc. Other factors, notably institutional ones, are also at work in the economy, supporting the creative mechanisms in the technological system and the selection mechanisms in the competence bloc.
The effects of new technology and competence on economic growth are conditional on the existence of several critical institutional circumstances. This makes it scientifically incorrect to build and test models of economic growth in which technology exercises a direct (''linear'') positive leverage on output by prior design. New technology introduced through entry is, in fact, wholly contingent upon a number of institutional factors, notably access to competent venture capital, and above all, upon the existence of a viable exit mechanism ; Bruun this issue; Robertson et al. this issue) .
The correct specification of the entire technology creation, selection, and industrialization process is highly non-linear and closer to the earlier version of Schumpeter (1911) than his later linearized (1942) version. Competence blocs and technological systems together create the non-linear micro-based systems dynamics that endogenize economic growth. Such industrial dynamics (a positive sum game) are by definition and design excluded both from the neoclassical model and from recent linear versions of evolutionary Schumpeterian modeling. The EOE and the embodied theory of competence blocs, however, grow from experimental selection in markets and hierarchies. We therefore have to be precise in defining our departure from the linear Schumpeterian model and from the neoclassical model or the Walras-Arrow-Debreu (WAD) paradigm into non-linear experimental country. This can be done by beginning with Alfred Marshall who struggled already in 1890 with the problems that WAD theory and Input/Output theory have yet to solve.
The paper is organized as follows. Following a review of the relevant literature, we outline the main ideas behind the evolutionary theory of the EOE in which macroeconomic growth is generated by experimental selection. A dynamic version of Marshall's industrial districts is used as a pedagogical example to relate our thinking to both evolutionary economic modeling and to so-called new growth theory. We then summarize the concept of innovative technological supply or the technological system and present the competence bloc as the organizer of a more or less efficient project selection process. We then explain how the confrontation between the creative innovators and economic actors who select projects yields economic growth. We refer to this as industrial dynamics. We illustrate the argument with a few case studies and present summary results of micro-to-macro simulations of endogenous growth based on micro dynamics, before offering some concluding remarks.
Marshall on new growth theory
Adam Smith (1776) summed up his observations on the industrial reorganization process that was taking place around him by identifying the decentralization of production (''outsourcing''), economies of scale, and coordination through markets (''the invisible hand'') as the determinants of growth of the economic wealth of nations. Adam Smith's theory constituted an open-ended system (Loasby 1991) with an ''infinite state space''. He was satisfied with having a dynamically coordinated and growing (value-creating) economy and, hence, there was no need for a distinction between equilibrium and stability (Eliasson 1992) . Walras (1874 Walras ( /1954 closed the system by imposing market clearing. This was a remarkable intellectual achievement in itself, but it removed economic theory from a previously solid empirical footing. It also created ''new'' theoretical problems, above all how to handle the increasing returns everywhere visible, when theory demanded decreasing returns in order for an interior equilibrium to be reached. Marshall (1890 Marshall ( , 1919 was frustrated by that incompatibility between facts and theory. His solution was to create the concept of a positive externality in the form of an industrial district. Individual firms experienced decreasing returns when increasing one input, ceteris paribus. But the decreasing returns effect could be overcome by joining an industrial district and thereby enjoying a positive systems (synergy) effect, a positive externality. This positive systems effect from the industrial district is closely related to the notion of technological spillovers.
Marshall's endeavors were not appreciated by his contemporaries, especially when he continued insisting in Industry and Trade (1919) that economic theory had a problem with reality. Sraffa (1926) attempted to argue the problem away. Young (1928) agreed, saying essentially that Walrasian theory was useless when it came to explaining and understanding dynamics. Hicks (1939) argued that such heresy should not be allowed.
In Marshall's view, output at each point in time was limited from above by the invisible competence or systems capital of the entire industrial district, a knowledge capital that could only be raised slowly, and at rapidly decreasing returns. In today's language this could be seen as an early theory of spillovers or a modern micro-based version of so-called new growth theory. Romer (1986) used exactly the same idea in his macro new growth model when he introduced a systems competence capital, an externality in a traditional neoclassical growth model. Also, in Romer (1986 Romer ( , 1990 and in Lucas (1988) an interior static equilibrium was achieved by postulating diminishing returns to learning or accumulating the externality.
The world of the EOE is more in the micro-based tradition of Marshall than that of the static macro world of new growth theory. The new growth model can be seen as a statistical measurement design of the theory of the EOE and of Marshall's model, in the sense that data being generated by a model of the EOE would also be compatible with a macroeconometric model of new growth theory. The explanation of the same growth data would, however, be entirely different (see below). While in new growth theory all firms are identical, in the EOE they are quite heterogeneous. In order to capture the dynamics, we need to specify both the supply side, where and how new ideas and technologies are created, and the demand side (the selection process), as well as the confrontation of the two dimensions.
THE DYNAMICS OF THE EXPERIMENTALLY ORGANIZED ECONOMY
The notion of the EOE rests on the assumption of an enormous state space (set of technical possibilities) that (1) is completely non-transparent to all actors in the model economy, including central government; (2) includes business solutions that are far superior to all known business solutions; (3) features a set of business opportunities that is constantly expanding through learning or search into it; and (4) constantly leads to business mistakes. Here we talk about the Särimner effect, recognizing the pig from the Viking sagas that was eaten for supper, only to return next afternoon, to be eaten again for supper (Eliasson 1987 (Eliasson : 29, 1992 ). The only difference is that the business opportunity set expands from being exploited: we have a positive sum game. The expansion of the business opportunity set is supported by innovations from the technological systems. This paper is concerned with the macroeconomic implications of the theory of the EOE.
The assumptions of a vast and completely non-transparent opportunity set differentiates the theory of the EOE from the neoclassical or WAD model. The WAD model state space is small and fully transparent by assumption. Agents make no business mistakes by assumption since they manage somehow to locate themselves in the position they would have taken up had they been fully informed. Even the auctioneer, or the central planner of the WAD model, can do his job without making an error, by assumption. But when the technical possibility set is virtually unlimited, the identification of technical possibilities and their conversion into business opportunities is beyond explicit human analytical faculties. Once technical possibilities are identified, they can form the core of a technological system. This requires an organization of knowledge as well as of human beings, or groups of human beings, with embodied (tacit) competences. The identification and exploitation of business opportunities arising from these technical possibilities take place within what we call a competence bloc. Individuals and organizations often make business mistakes, as does the government. But they will all learn, create competence, and use competence. How that competence is created and allocated needs to be incorporated into the analysis. The only thing we know for sure is that, however well all actors do their jobs, there will always be better but unknown ways to do the same job. To formulate the theoretical framework, we consequently have to break up the very foundation of the neoclassical model. We then arrive at the model of the EOE in which actors are compelled by each other to act so as not to succumb to competition, and in which growth occurs through experimental project selection. Competence bloc theory is needed to understand the nature of that selection. Indeed, very little change in assumptions is needed to leave the WAD model and arrive in the EOE world.
The knowledge-based information economy
We first introduce the notion of a knowledge-based information economy where extreme quality variation characterizes demand (Eliasson 1990b (Eliasson , 1996 . This allows us to establish the empirical foundation for a state space (of our model) of such enormous dimensions that (almost) all actors become grossly ignorant even of (for them) relevant circumstances. This change in assumptions for our analysis is basic in that it removes the theoretical possibility of both optimizing and maintaining the assumption that ex ante plans equal ex post outcomes. The empirical relevance of the change in assumptions is documented by demonstrating that the use of resources for information processing and communications by producers ''to find an equilibrium'' (assumed to be zero in the WAD model or approximately so) dominates resource use in the normal business firm. This means that business decisions will have to be seen as more or less well-prepared (business) experiments that often fail. There will be no such thing as an external equilibrium to look for. We are in the model of the EOE, where growth occurs through the experimental creation and selection of innovations.
The experimentally organized economy
The theory of the EOE is an alternative to the WAD model. The main difference between the two is the assumed size of state space. It is assumed to be extremely small and sufficiently transparent for actors to identify all options in the WAD model. It is extremely large and non-transparent in the EOE. The EOE thus embodies the experimental nature of a viable market economy. It has its roots in the Austrian economics of Carl Menger (1871) and further elaborations in Schumpeter's early work (1911) , often referred to as Schumpeter I, as distinguished from his later work, Schumpeter II (1942) , in which the innovation process is described as a ''linear'' process in the sense that increased investment in R&D leads to greater innovative output which results in increased economic growth.
1 By placing the technological system in the model of the EOE and of competence blocs we break the sequential approach. It means, in fact, that we are back into the original Darwinian environment of Winter (1964) rather than in the Schumpeter II type Nelson-Winter (1982) evolutionary model.
The dynamics of the EOE represent a theory of micro-based endogenous growth.
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The EOE yields economic growth through experimental creation and selection of innovative projects in markets (entry), while at the same time forcing badly managed incumbents or new losers to exit. This is a typical (dynamic) efficiency problem. The problem for the policy maker is to organize institutions such that winners are retained and losers forced to release resources, notably labor, to the growing firms. This dynamic turns exiting losers into growth-promoting factors . The efficiency of the selection becomes important. In stylized form we can talk about the Schumpeterian creative destruction process as it is presented in Table 1 (see further  Eliasson 1996: 45, 2001a, 2003) . If society is ''efficiently'' organized and equipped with the right institutions and incentives, this dynamically competitive process of experimental selection will lead to macroeconomic growth. Dynamic efficiency in the EOE can be characterized by the capacity of the economic system to minimize the economic consequences of two types of errors: keeping losers for too long (Type I errors) and (most important) losing the winners (Type II errors). The solution is a matter of organizing diverse and distributed competences over markets such that each project is exposed to a maximum of competent and varied evaluation. We use competence bloc theory to analyze this situation. Before we Source: Eliasson (1996: 45) .
get there we have to look at the nature of the supply of innovations to be filtered through the competence bloc, i.e. at the technological system.
THE SUPPLY OF INNOVATIONS-THE TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEM
There are three dimensions to technological systems: (1) a cognitive dimension defining the clustering of technologies resulting in a new set of technical possibilities, (2) an organizational and institutional dimension capturing the interactions in the network of actors engaged in the creation of these technologies, and (3) an economic dimension defined as the overlap with the competence bloc: the market for innovations.
Design space-the cognitive dimension of technological systems
As mentioned, in the EOE, the state space is enormous. This means that only a small subset of all technical possibilities are identified at any time, and only a subset of these are identified as business opportunities. 3 New business opportunities result from new combinations through identification of existing (but previously ignored or unnoticed) or emerging technical possibilities, re-combinations of existing business opportunities, or new combinations of new technical possibilities with existing business opportunities.
Clusters of complementary technical capabilities can be referred to as design spaces (Stankiewicz 2002) . A design space represents a small part of the opportunity set or the state space of the EOE (which can be viewed as representing the sum total of all technical possibilities). It may be thought of as the set of all known ways to group together the technical capabilities required for a particular type of economic activity. In that sense a design space includes all the (believed to be) relevant knowledge embodied in people and the possible ways people with tacit knowledge can be organized to interact to achieve synergistic results. Figure 1 provides an example. The upper part of the figure shows a small area within the (virtually boundaryless) state space that represents the known technical possibilities relevant for a particular type of industrial activity, such as pharmaceuticals. The black dots within this area represent the technical combinations currently in use. These combinations are largely drawn from chemistry and chemical engineering. Below this design space for conventional pharmaceuticals are other design spaces representing various known applications of biotechnology (biology, biochemistry, genetics, etc.). One area of application is drugs; others are agriculture and food industry and pulp and paper industry.
Design spaces undergo constant evolution. We can distinguish between three modes of technological growth (accumulation) in the design spaces:
Ω The expansion of the space through the addition of new capabilities or clusters of capabilities (this would be represented by adding new black dots in Figure 1 ). Ω The progressive integration and structuring of the design spaces through the coevolution of its various elements (as shown in Figure 1 by linking together conventional and biotechnology competencies supporting pharmaceuticals). Ω The accumulation of application-specific know-how linked to the evolutionary trajectories of particular artifacts, such as, for instance, cardiovascular drugs (expansion of existing dots).
The emergence of new technological clusters or the transformation of existing ones can be initiated by a particular technical breakthrough. Thus, in the case of ''new'' biotechnology, the triggering events were Watson and Crick's discovery of the double helix or the DNA structure and how it is used in the cells and the consequent development of a series of techniques around the mid-1970s, such as recombinant DNA and monoclonal antibody techniques. However, the growth and expansion of a design space and, with it, of the technological opportunity set, usually requires that such novelties be integrated within a wider cluster of competencies. Thus, biotechnology is merging with laboratory technology, computer technology, agricultural practices (Eliasson, Å. 2002) , as well as healthcare (Eliasson, G. and Eliasson, Å. 1996) in a variety of new combinations. Hence, the boundaries and characteristics of technological systems originate in various design spaces that grow, mature, subdivide, and/or converge. As a result, new technological possibilities emerge, some of which constitute business opportunities. This is represented in Figure 1 . With the emergence of biotechnology, a vast new set of technical possibilities has opened up. As a result, the technology base for pharmaceuticals has expanded to include not only the conventional technologies based on chemistry and chemical engineering but also biotechnology, particularly in the form of human genetics. This means that the design space supporting pharmaceuticals has expanded.
Similarly, the current explosion of business opportunities in the computing and communications industry can be explained by the special enabling features of digital technology the development of which began some 50 years ago, a subset of which constitutes Internet technology.
The organizational and institutional dimension
A second dimension of a technological system is the network of actors who embody the system. This consists of all individuals who contribute to the growth and structuring of the design space in question. These individuals are spread across a variety of organizations: companies, universities, other R&D and educational organizations, public bureaucracies, industry organizations, and so forth. They include inventors, researchers, engineers, managers and bureaucrats, and many others. Such technological communities support the formation of problem-solving networks, and, hence, also innovation. As the design space changes (and with it the supporting knowledge base), the relevant actors and networks also change.
A ''design team'' in the aircraft industry, consisting sometimes of hundreds of interacting sub-teams (Eliasson 1995: 52f.) , can be seen as embodying the total knowledge necessary to design a new aircraft-an empirical approximation of the network of actors in a particular design space. Similarly, departments at technical universities and industrial laboratories tend to have specialists in-house that are complementary to their core technology. IBM in its heyday, in fact, using its vast resources, attempted to build and maintain complete ''design spaces'' through a vast global network of laboratories with thousands of scientists and engineers that would keep the company prepared for every possible new technology that might challenge its technological superiority (Eliasson 1996) . The Xerox Park laboratory was based on a similar philosophy. Today, research departments in mechanical engineering need a whole range of specialists in computing, software, and programming. They are part of their current design space, but were not so some 30 years or so ago. Another way of operationally defining a design space is with reference to the Manhattan (first atomic bomb) or ''the first man on the moon'' projects. All (believed to be relevant) knowledge embodied in people was brought together in one huge team that represented an approximation of the design space needed to accomplish the task.
These design teams or technological communities provide the basic social matrix that encourages or discourages the formation of effective problem-solving networks. Their members are linked by a variety of relationships including shared organizational affiliation, professional links, buyer-supplier relationships, social ties, etc. These linkages determine the R&D agendas of different actors and the patterns of communication, collaboration, and competition among them. Their strength and density depend on the geographic location of the actors, their institutional affiliation, the economic incentive regimes under which they operate, cultural factors, and so forth. They can be influenced by various deliberate policies such as the creation of appropriate bridging institutions and other arrangements that promote interactivity within the actor networks.
The economic dimension
Each set of technical possibilities can give rise to a variety of business opportunities. The set of technical solutions created is far greater than the corresponding set of business opportunities (cf. footnote 3 above). Business opportunities can be exploited in various markets. Thus, to the extent that a generic technology (such as biotechnology), which forms the core of one technological system, creates business opportunities in several markets (e.g. biomedicine and agriculture), it may be associated with economic actors in several different arenas. The supply of technical solutions (innovations) is confronted by the demand side or the competence bloc in the market for innovations. We refer to the economic actors in a particular product or demand arena (such as healthcare services) as a competence bloc.
The primary function of a technological system is to organize technical knowledge and the actors who embody this knowledge, as well as organizations and institutions supporting the creation and diffusion of knowledge, in such a way as to promote the conversion of technical possibilities into business opportunities. The effectiveness of this conversion process depends on the economic actors in the competence bloc.
The presentation of the technological system, so far, gives some general clues to the interior characteristics to look for when evaluating its innovative, technology creating capacity. We should not attempt to go further because unpredictability in a non-stochastic way 4 is in the very nature of innovative activity in the Austrian and early Schumpeterian setting of the EOE. We can define the circumstances under which more innovations rather than fewer are created, but not their functional characteristics. Our previous work on technological systems suggests three features of particular importance: a high degree of absorptive capacity (receiver competence), a high degree of connectivity among the actors, and strong mechanisms to create and maintain variety (see especially Carlsson 1997: Chap. 10) . Innovations generated within the technological system are sorted out in the market for innovations in the confrontation with the demand side of the competence bloc. The outcome is entirely unpredictable in the sense of Austrian economics; the analytical outcome of technological systems analyses can be no more than a presentation of the features of the technological systems that raise the supply of innovations.
The nature of innovative supply, notably of radically new innovations, has been the subject of both scholarly study and intellectual controversy. Some would argue (as did Schumpeter 1911 ) that innovations are by definition beyond analytical understanding. They enter the stage of economic activity as an unpredictable deus ex machina. This is the basic notion of our analysis. However, once a technical possibility has been identified, technological systems and competence blocs are helpful tools in analyzing how that technical possibility is converted into a business opportunity and, in turn, how it propels economic growth. The greater the receiver competence (Eliasson 1990a; Robertson et al. this issue) or absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990) in the system, the greater is the chance that opportunities will be identified.
THE DEMAND FOR INNOVATIONS: COMPETENCE BLOC THEORY
In the vast and non-transparent business opportunity set of the EOE, even very competent actors are grossly ignorant of the relevant circumstances for their decision making. This ignorance refers not only to the supplies of radically new innovations but also to the competence and strategic actions of competitors. On the innovation input side of the competence bloc, far more technologies enter and are combined and subjected to commercial screening than can ever hope to be identified as promising projects by the entrepreneurs. And as the selection progresses through the filter of economic criteria that makes up a competence bloc, an increasing number of technological systems will become involved as the composite technology package that temporarily defines a product is being determined. At that stage a stable technological system can no longer be defined. Hence, the market for innovations defines an overlap between several technological systems being integrated as composite products, and the innovation input side of the competence bloc. The complexity of that dynamic is extreme. Business mistakes abound and become a normal outcome of the experimental selection process, and the effectiveness of that selection becomes a core problem both for the firm and for the economy at large.
Competence bloc theory deals with that effectiveness problem. It is defined by the set of functions performed by actors with competence needed to minimize the negative economic consequences of the two kinds of business mistakes referred to above. The EOE recognizes tacit competencies. The competence bloc is a theoretical design that allows us to deal with the efficient organization of decentralized tacit knowledge without specifying the content of knowledge except by function and to some extent by carrier. One could, therefore, say that a competence bloc also defines the minimum set of actors needed to develop an industry.
At this stage of our presentation two actors dominate the scene: the customer and the innovator. The customer represents the demand side and is the ultimate arbitrageur in a market economy. The innovator represents the supply side of new technology. Industrial dynamics result when the two meet directly or through their representative intermediaries in the markets for innovation (next section).
We have, at the top of the list of actors in the competence bloc, the competent customer who defines the maximum degree of ''sophistication'' of the project for which the most advanced customers are willing to pay. 5 The competence bloc incorporates the Burenstam-Linder (1961) idea that advanced customers constitute a comparative advantage for the rich industrial countries. The customer often contributes directly to product technology in the purchasing of advanced products such as aircraft, where the user may be as technologically knowledgeable as the producer. The normal situation, however, is that the customer chooses between different product offers. Heterogeneity in the supply of innovative new products and a rich supply of competent customers with varying tastes, therefore, is important for technological development.
The innovator (item 2) is defined to be the actor who combines new and old technologies into new composite technologies, 6 to be selected by economic (profitability) criteria by the entrepreneurs (item 3). As mentioned already, innovative technology supply in item 2 overlaps with the technological system to define the markets for innovation. The innovator should be defined in theory as a technologically competent actor, even though he/she in practice may act also in the capacity of an inventor and an entrepreneur. The dynamics of the markets for innovation are to be found in the intersection of the technological system and the competence bloc with respect to the innovation process in the EOE. This intersection is the focus of the analysis of the next section.
The entrepreneur normally needs external financing to move expected winners on, and that financing has to be associated with the competence needed to understand the entrepreneurial selection. Otherwise the conditions will be so tough as to leave little or nothing for the innovator and the entrepreneur. Hence, competent venture capitalists (item 4) are defined by their ability to identify winners (Eliasson, G. and Eliasson, Å. 1996) . They therefore include the early stage, so-called business angels, but not necessarily all later stage institutional financing institutions that often call themselves venture capitalists. The competent venture capitalist however, needs a large and viable exit market (item 5) to unload his stake profitably, at an appropriate time.
7 If a real winner is moving through the competence bloc, the next step is for a competent industrialist (item 6) to take over and move the project on to industrial scale production and distribution. Apparently, all later stages (actors in the competence bloc) are important for establishing the incentives to act at earlier stages. If the competence bloc is not vertically complete, the risks are large that even winners will ''get lost''.
Yet vertical completeness is not sufficient. A single actor in each function does not guarantee a varied and competent project evaluation. Many of each with greatly different competences are needed. Only when vertical completeness and horizontal 5 It should be noted that the customer here is assumed to know what the desired product is and what its desirable features are. 6 This is the definition of von Mises (1949) . We prefer that to the less clear definition of Schumpeter, who allowed our innovators and entrepreneurs to mix. Von Mises' definition is also the appropriate one for our innovation supply and demand analysis which requires well-defined tasks or functions. Our definition is therefore the appropriate one in a theoretical context, even though the innovator and the entrepreneur in reality may be one and the same person. 7 Exit by the venture capitalist can occur through an initial public offering (IPO) or through acquisition by another company.
variety are in place can potential winners confidently pursue their search. Increasing returns to continued search then prevail and the risks that winners are overlooked are minimized. Thus, competence bloc theory is sufficient to demonstrate not only the critical role played by competent venture capitalists and exit markets to identify and move winners in new technologies to industrial scale production. It also demonstrates the need for variety or heterogeneity. A large company internalizes more or less the various functions of the competence bloc, notably venture financing, the exit markets, and the industrialization process. It does that by reducing variety in the selection process, because innovative variety disturbs the static efficiency of a large hierarchy. The distribution of internal firm activities over a competence bloc therefore offers an organizational solution by combining the innovative creativity of the small entrepreneurial firm with the static efficiency of the large volume producer.
INDUSTRIAL DYNAMICS AND THE MARKETS FOR INNOVATION
Technological systems create the sets of technical solutions that constitute innovation supply. The number of technical solutions is far greater than the corresponding set of business opportunities that is selected in the markets for innovations (when innovation supplies meet the demand determined via the competent commercial evaluation by the actors in the competence bloc). The dynamics of that confrontation isolates potential winners for further filtering through the competence bloc. The better organized the technological systems, the richer the menu of innovative choices offered in the market for innovations. The more vertically complete and horizontally varied the competence bloc, the lower the risk that winners will be overlooked.
There is constant competition among technologies in each product area. A knowledge breakthrough may shift the design space for a particular technology and lead to a reconfiguration of the product range based on that technology (new products entering and others exiting). Whether or not this leads to a different menu of products being offered in the market depends on the next step in the innovation process. Innovators may now enter the process, combining and integrating the new technologies in various ways, each perhaps identifying different potential markets and customers.
Thus, there is selection going on both within and among technologies and the supporting technological systems. Innovators select and combine technologies into products. The result of this selection process is a potentially marketable product or set of products. Then the market selection takes place within the competence bloc, one for each product market. The economic dimension of the technological system and the competence bloc overlap in that they have the innovator in common. The interface is where an innovator finds a potential application of a technology (a product) and that product is identified as a potential winner. The role of the entrepreneur is to find the resources (management, finance, etc.) necessary to successfully commercialize the product.
The technological system views the innovation process from the (technology) supply side. The core technology may be manifested in a variety of products. Each new product is normally based on an innovative combination that draws on several technological systems. For example, as mentioned earlier, biotechnology is applied in pharmaceuticals as well as in agriculture, the food industry, forest industry, and possibly many others. Each of these applications uses biotechnology as one among several technology inputs. But the pharmaceutical industry also uses technologies originating in other knowledge areas, e.g. chemistry, chemical engineering, mechanical engineering, and information technology, in combination with biotechnology. Thus, there is no one-to-one correspondence between a technology and a particular product or product area. Indeed, the application of a technology may not at all be in the area originally envisioned by the innovator.
If we view the innovation process from the demand or product (competence bloc) side instead, we may find that the end product (say, delivery of healthcare services) is made up of a whole range of technologies, each dependent on different supporting technological systems. Diagnostic instruments, pharmaceuticals, and medical supplies are examples of such components in the delivery of healthcare services.
While the technology system delivers the capacity to innovate, the competence bloc defines the incentives to innovate. The effectiveness of the competence bloc is defined by its capacity (1) to reflect customer preferences and (2) to translate those preferences into competent evaluations at the different selection stages of the competence bloc. The effectiveness of the competence bloc in these two functions enables it to focus on the right innovations. This determines the demand price for innovations and, hence, the incentives as perceived by the innovators in the technological system. The technological system supplies a variety of innovative technologies to be subjected to the entrepreneurial selection process in the competence bloc and guided over financial markets by customer (demand) signals. In the intersection of the economic dimension of the technological system (item 2 in Table 2 ) and the entrepreneurial selection process (item 3) a market for innovations is established that selects winners to be moved on through the competence bloc to industrial scale production and distribution. This is represented in Figure 2 . The key result to be drawn from the theory of the EOE is that the new menu of products being offered in the market is analytically indeterminate.
Many, perhaps most, innovators do not fare well in this sorting process and are forced to exit at an early stage. Others fare better, but their fate depends on their business plans being accepted and understood by the financial actors and-if winners-moved on by industrialists who have the receiver competence to efficiently convert them into volume production and distribution. Even for winners, this last function often fails due to deficient (receiver) competence. Innovators who integrate technologies in new ways 3.
Entrepreneurs who identify profitable innovations 4.
Competent venture capitalists who recognize and finance the entrepreneurs 5.
Exit markets that facilitate ownership change 6.
Industrialists who take successful innovations to industrial scale production The competence applied to individual projects during this filtering determines whether winners are selected and moved on and losers forced to exit. But competence is only a necessary, not a sufficient requirement. Incentives have to be in place to make winners willing to invest and grow, and there must be competition to force them to do so and push losers down and out. This is a matter of the existence of the right institutions.
The role of institutions
The role of institutions in the EOE is to create incentives and direct competition such that the creative destruction process is converted into a positive sum game of economic growth (Eliasson 2001a) . This is a matter of the positive selection of winners, the allocation of resources to winners, and the withdrawal of resources from losers (such that they stop growing and/or exit making resources available for reallocation). Winners have to be concerned about creating and capturing the potential rents from their competence and/or avoid being out-competed by other actors. Exit and stagnation among the losers are a positive contribution to growth in this system.
Only when winners are (1) effectively selected, (2) inclined to invest and grow, and (3) the system allocates resources to finance their investments, will growth occur. This is a matter of the nature of institutions supporting incentives (for winners) to invest and grow and enforcing competition to filter out losers.
Industrial dynamics
The confrontation between technological possibilities and market opportunities follows the creative destruction process outlined above. Radically new innovations are normally carried out by new entrants (item 1 in Table 1 ) together representing (in each market or competence bloc) an unsorted supply of losers and winners. The spread in business potential is, therefore, much larger than among incumbents. Some winners, therefore, will subject incumbents to competitive pressure, and the more intense this competitive pressure, the more active the entrepreneurial entry process, forcing entrants to reorganize or contract or leave. This process defines the industrial dynamics of an economy. Such dynamics can propel or obstruct economic growth (depending on their success) and create new industries.
THREE CASES OF INDUSTRIAL DYNAMICS
In this section we provide three examples (in the form of brief case studies) of the confrontation between technological systems and competence blocs. They are (1) the emergence and disappearance of a Swedish computer industry; (2) the failed development of a business information systems product within Ericsson; and (3) the accidental success of Ericsson's mobile telephony business.
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The first story is simple. In the late 1950s Saab, the Swedish manufacturer of automobiles and military aircraft, was far ahead of its European competitors and not more than a year behind Control Data, Philco, GE, Remington Rand, Honeywell, and IBM in the USA in developing a fully transistorized computer. This was an accidental spillover product developed for internal use within Saab, but it was quickly adapted for the market. While Saab was a superb technological leader in Europe (constituting, in effect, the core of the technological system for transistorized computers in Sweden), it lacked the supporting market competences equivalent to the competence bloc in place in the US market. Thus, the technological system yielded innovations, but the incompleteness of the competence bloc led to failure in the market.
The struggling Saab computer company (DataSaab), employing some 3,000 people, was picked up by Ericsson in 1981 in its failed attempt to enter, together with some 40 other firms in the world, the in fact non-existent market for business information systems. Again, the reason for failure was the narrow internal evaluation and project selection process in the many large companies entering that market in the early 1980s. This selection was based on technical criteria rather than on market reality. The competence bloc had been internalized within the company, providing a very narrow evaluation process, which failed to expose the projects to all the competences needed to orient the selection commercially. Thus, similarly to the previous case, and in spite of a promising technological base, the competence bloc failed at an early stage.
The top-level managerial focus in Ericsson on the business information system as the future winner almost turned both Ericsson mobile telephony and the whole company into a casualty. Little understanding of radio telephony existed at the top management level of Ericsson. In order to support its big venture into the business information systems market, Ericsson had acquired almost the entire Swedish computer and software industry. When the business information systems venture failed during the second half of the 1980s, it took the budding Swedish computer industry with it (Eliasson 1996) . Fortunately for Ericsson it had also been involved in military radio electronics. As a result, the company inadvertently ended up with a complete and successful technological system for radio telegraphy. But there was insufficient variety of actors in the competence bloc to support radio telephony and to filter out the business information systems venture in time. Thanks to the persistence of an internal and suppressed intrapreneur within Ericsson, working at a fairly high level on the basis of a hidden defense account, and the keen interest of its main customer (the Swedish Telecommunications authority, now Telia), Ericsson was prepared (by accident) when mobile telephony suddenly emerged as a winning technology during the second half of the 1980s.
Thus, the keys to growth appear to be variety of competence in the competence bloc, which works to support efficient selections, and completeness of the competence bloc, which works to move the winner to industrial scale production and distribution. When Ericsson top management finally understood that they had a winner, vertical support through the competence bloc immediately clicked in.
MICRO-BASED MACRO ANALYSIS-MODEL SIMULATIONS
While it is not possible within this paper to present detailed information about microbased macro analyses on the Model of the Swedish Economic System (MOSES), 9 we will summarize a few results that will at least capture the flavor of the simulations we have carried out while also illustrating the mechanisms that create innovations, introduce them into the economy, and generate growth. MOSES is a model approximation of the theory of EOE.
In one set of simulations we examined the effects of various features of technological systems on economic growth, particularly the role of networking, absorptive capacity (receptivity), and connectivity (Carlsson 1997) . The simulations showed that it is important to be connected to a network. The basic reason is the imbalance between the limited knowledge and experience in each firm, and the greater knowledge existing in the economy at large. Thus, in networks the yield on each investment, whether in physical capital or knowledge, rises as a result of knowledge spillovers, and the economy grows faster. It does not seem to matter much who the other network members are; the important thing is that networks expand the range of options available to each participant and increase the experience base upon which decisions can be made. The performance of the economy clearly declines when both connectivity and receptivity are reduced.
Entry of new firms is the main vehicle through which innovations are introduced into the economy. Several simulations show that high entry and exit rates generate growth, even without varying the supply of innovations through the technological system. Competent actors evaluate the projects created in the technological (innovation) system. The rate at which winners are moved up through the competence bloc and are willing to invest and grow depends on the institutions determining incentives and competition in the economy. This growth dynamic has been quantitatively demonstrated in two simulation studies on the MOSES economy . The simulations illustrate the critical importance and large magnitudes of non-linear system effects in a dynamic economy (the positive sum game).
The large systemic productivity gains observable at higher levels of aggregation (achieved through resource reallocations, notably through firm turnover), have been documented in many simulations. For example, Carlsson (1980) studied the content of total factor productivity growth in Swedish manufacturing. He both decomposed total factor productivity growth top down, and simulated total factor productivity growth bottom up on the MOSES model, and came out with roughly the same result: at least 50 percent of total factor productivity growth during a particular historic period could be attributed to the entry and exit of firms and establishments. The simulations also demonstrate how the same positive systems effects of innovative new technologies can be more or less completely eliminated if institutions are not supportive, and how the generation of long-term positive or negative macroeconomic effects from minor accidental occurrences (like policy making) are completely beyond the understanding and control of policy makers. The large negative macroeconomic effects of constraining the exit process and locking in resources, notably labor, through industrial subsidies were also clearly and quantitatively demonstrated by simulation on the MOSES model economy in the 1980s (Carlsson 1983a, b) .
Firms in the MOSES model exhibit many differences, including different levels of productivity at each point in time. Firms are continually threatened both by their ''superiors'' and by potential new entrants. If this were all, and if superior firms never made mistakes, the MOSES model would eventually suffer the Schumpeter (1942) syndrome, one superior firm eventually dominating its market. All other firms would be forced to exit. This is exactly what happened in early simulations without entry on the MOSES model (Eliasson 1984) . Dynamics did not disappear, but the model economy crashed. On the other hand, if innovative entry is allowed (Eliasson 1991b; , all incumbent firms will be threatened, and the more inferior they are compared with top of the line entrants, the larger the incentives for innovative entry. Empirical evidence indicates that the average performance of incumbents is superior to the average performance of entrants, although for entrants the spread is much larger. Over time, hence, radically superior technologies are introduced into an economy through new entry (Eliasson 1991b; . Inferior entrants soon fail and exit. Incumbent firms are forced to respond through reorganization and/or rationalization. Pure rationalization is usually the last step taken before death or exit. demonstrate that if there is no entry, there are no, or only small, positive effects to be gained from raising labor mobility or the exit rate, all else being equal. Only disorderly market activities follow, frequently lowering longterm output growth. However, if entry is raised through appropriate institutional arrangements but labor market mobility remains low and/or exits are slow, no positive long-term growth effects of entry can be observed in simulations. Resources are locked in and factor prices raised, making growth investments less profitable across the economy. However, if entry, labor mobility, and exit rates can be simultaneously increased, a strong positive surge in long-term growth can be observed in simulations. This is a typical non-linearity in the economy generated through the institutions supporting the competence bloc. These results are further elaborated in , who show that an overly speedy firm turnover process can disturb the market information system, causing unreliable price signaling, leading to more frequent business (selection) failure and less growth. We have again a typically nonlinear relationship between innovative supply and macroeconomic growth. There is a positive relationship that turns negative when firm turnover exceeds certain levels, and, notably, is not supported by a concomitant and efficient exit process.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have shown that it is possible to specify the mechanisms that generate innovations and filter them by economic criteria, and thereby to endogenize economic growth. The contribution of new growth theory-focusing on knowledge (represented by research and development) as the source of growth-is valuable but is a very crude representation of the economic relationships between R&D and innovative output (the knowledge production function) and tells nothing about how knowledge is transformed into economic growth. The key is to focus on the conditions that are conducive to the creation of a variety of new technologies-technological systemsand on those that are necessary and sufficient for effective selection and retention of winners via what we call competence blocs. Both of these concepts are combined within the theory of the experimentally organized economy (EOE) in which the state space is virtually unlimited, ignorance is rampant, mistakes are commonplace, and progress is made through experimentation. It also means that while technology is necessary for economic growth, it is never sufficient. This means that the content of the innovation process is analytically indeterminate. The confrontations between actors and between actors and ideas represent the market for innovations and give rise to what we call industrial dynamics.
Economic growth is inherently a micro phenomenon. It is a matter of experimental creation of a variety of ideas, some of which result in new technologies that are confronted with potential buyers (customers) in dynamic markets and hierarchies. Many more technical possibilities are created than there are business opportunities, and the dynamics of the economic sorting process makes the relationships between innovative inputs, innovative outputs, and economic growth highly non-linear.
